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Calculation of Attorneys' Fees 
Awards in Title VII Actions 
Against Private Defendants 
DRUCILLA STENDER RAMEY* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 is a comprehensive 
statute which has as its primary purpose assuring "equality of employ-
ment opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that dis-
criminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."2 
Although the governmental role in the Act's enforcement is substantial, 
"the plaintiff [victim of discrimination] is the chosen instrument of Con-
gress to vindicate 'a policy that Congress considered of the highest 
priority.' "3 
Central to this "private attorney general" function is Title VII's 
provision for award of reasonable attorneys' fees to prevailing parties: 
"In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its 
discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorneys' 
fee as part of the costs ... ."4 In enacting the fees provision, Congress 
recognized that most victims of discrimination are unable to afford legal 
representation in vindicating their rights under the Act. Accordingly, 
Congress sought to encourage attorneys to take these onerous cases by 
mandating calculation of fee awards at levels applied in other areas of 
equally complex federal litigation, including antitrust suits.5 
Although plaintiffs' entitlement to an attorney's fee under the Act 
has been liberally construed by the courts in light of the beneficial 
remedial objectives of the legislation,6 trial judges have calculated these 
• Associate Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law. B.A., 
Radcliffe College; J.D., Yale Law School. Professor Ramey is also Chair of the Board of 
Directors of the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California. The author 
gratefully acknowledges the research contribution of Eva Herzer. 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to 17 (1976l[hereinafter cited as the Act or Title VII]. 
2. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). 
3. Christianburg Garment Co. v EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418 (1978), quoting Newman 
v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 401, 402 (1967). 
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976). 
5. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS, 5908, 5913. See also notes 50-77 & accompanying text infra. 
6. See Christianburg Garment Co. v EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417 (1978). Title VII 
prevailing plaintiffs are ordinarily entitled to attorneys' fees in all but special cir-
cumstances. Ordinarily, a prevailing defendant can be awarded attorney's fees only if plain-
tiffs action is adjudged frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. [d. at 422. 
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fees at abnormally low levels.7 This has been accomplished through a 
variety of mechanisms including: arbitrary elimination of documented 
hours from fee requests; slashing of requested hourly rates; denial of 
the multiplier often applied in such cases to reflect that the fee is con-
tingent upon victory and its receipt is thereby delayed; and a refusal to 
make upward adjustments for services of exceptionally high quality.s As 
a result, while it is not unusual for courts to award hourly rates ranging 
from $125.00 to $250.00 to successful antitrust and securities class ac-
tion attorneys, their Title VII counterparts are fortunate to receive 
hourly rates averaging $40.00 to $100.00 in their most successful and 
complex cases.9 This extraordinary differential persists despite the com-
parably complex, lengthy, costly, and high-risk nature of the litigation 
involved, and in defiance of the equally strong public policy considera-
tions which underlie fee awards in both the commercial and civil rights 
spheres. 
Predictably, Title VII plaintiff attorneys increasingly have been 
forced by economic necessity to resort to more traditional and 
remunerative areas of practice. Many turn their expertise to Title VII 
defense work, which pays handsomely and on a current basis, while 
7. See, e.g., EEOC v. Strasburger, Price, 626 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1980)($10.60/hour); 
EEOC v Safeway Stores, 597 F.2d 364 (10th Cir. 1980)($12.22/hour); Jacobs v. Martin Sweets 
Co., 550 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1977)($27/hour); Kinsey v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, [1980]23 
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 773 (D.D.C. 1978)($40-$65/hour for partners; $20-$45/hour for 
associates); Saucedo v. Brothers Well Serv., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Tex. 1979)($40/hour); 
Parker v. Matthews, 411 F. Supp. 1059 (D.D.C. 1976)($60/hour). 
8. See cases cited in note 7 supra. See also Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Elec., Inc., 
603 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1979); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1978); 
Swicker v. William Armstrong & Sons, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Waters v. 
Heublein, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Bachman v. Pertschuk, [1980] 23 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cases 1046 (D.D.C. 1979). 
9. For example, in the federal securities suit In re Equity Funding Corp. of 
America Sec. Litigation, 438 F. Supp. 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1977), attorneys were awarded 
$6,458,310.00. In contrast, attorneys in a civil rights action, Gary v. Stone of La., 441 F. 
Supp. 1121 (E.D. La. 1977), received only $205,000.00 
A recent comprehensive survey of attorney's fee awards in 186 antitrust and 
securities class actions found that plaintiffs' attorneys were awarded an average of $213.37 
per hour. Those attorneys with recoveries in the highest recovery range ($10,233,000-
$218,000,000) averaged $249.90 per hour; those in the lowest recovery range ($102,720-
$650,000) averaged $102.34 per hour. All figures are based on 1980 deflated dollar values. 
Attorney Fee Awards in Antitrust and Securities Class Actions, 6 CLASS ACTION REPORTS 
82, 129 (1980)[hereinafter cited as Antitrust and Securities Class Actions]. 
An earlier unpublished survey of 140 district court fee awards established the mean 
hourly rate awarded in private antitrust actions to be $181.00 while the mean hourly rate 
awarded in Title VII cases was $40.00. Helfman, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: A 
Statistical Survey of One Hundred and Forty Recent District Court Cases Involving At-
torneys' Fees (1975)(project Submitted to the Faculty of Antioch School of Law), cited in 
Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is Reasonable?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281, 310 
n.l24 (1977)[hereinafter cited as Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees]. 
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others simply develop other specialties.10 Some practitioners, however, 
have devoted considerable effort to the fees issue, and have successfully 
convinced courts to compute fee awards on a basis which more closely 
achieves the purposes of the Act.ll 
In this article it will be argued that the legislative history of the at-
torneys' fees provision of Title VII requires that fee awards be com-
puted by a method which produces fees sufficient to sustain a Title VII 
bar, and that this may best be accomplished by a modified version of the 
approach customarily used in the antitrust area.12 
First addressed will be a brief overview of Title VII litigation prob-
lems, with emphasis on the complexity, duration, and high-risk nature of 
the work involved. Then follows a discussion of the legislative purpose 
of Title VII and its fee provisions, with particular attention to the 
strong public policy considerations which must underlie judicial im-
plementation of the fee award provisions of the Act. Next addressed 
will be the comparative advantages of the two primary methods of fee 
calculation employed by federal courts in complex litigation based, 
respectively, on the Title VII case of Johnson v. Georgia Highway Ex-
press I3 and the antitrust case of Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. v. 
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary COrp.I4 It will be argued that 
the Lindy method should be adopted by courts in computing Title VII 
fee awards. Lastly, two selected problem areas of implementation of 
Lindy in the Title VII context will be discussed.Is 
10. See, e.g., Declaration of Richard T. Seymour and Affidavit of Christopher D. 
Burdick filed in support of plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, 
Westerlund v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., [1981] 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1190 (N.D. Cal. 
1980)[hereinafter cited as Declaration of Seymour and Affidavit of Burdick, respectively]. In 
his Declaration, Mr. Seymour, a seasoned Title VII practitioner, states: 
When I opened my solo law office on October 1, 1973, I took with me a number of 
substantial class actions challenging employment discrimination ..•• In each of my 
class actions, I provided my services to the plaintiffs and class members without 
charge to them. This is common in the private enforcement of Title VII .... 
After three years and four months ... I closed my office in debt to a substantial 
amount ..•. 
In my judgment, the fees awarded by the courts in litigated cases have often not been 
sufficient to accomplish the purposes of the fee-award provisions of Title VII. 
[d. at 3-4. 
11. See Lewis v. FMC Corp., No. C-74-2327 RFP (SJ)(N.D. Cal., filed Sept. 12, 
1980)(Order of attorneys' fees)(attorney and paralegal fees of $289,373.24); Westerlund v. 
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., [1981] 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1190 (N.D. Cal. 1980)(attorneys' 
fees of $232,887); Neely v. City of Grenada, 624 F.2d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 1980)(hourly rate of 
$100 held appropriate for legal work of lead counsel). 
12. See Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 
487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lindy 1). 
13. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). 
14. 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976). 
15. This article will not survey exhaustively the vast field of attorney's fee award 
calculations in public interest cases. For a detailed and comprehensive discussion of the 
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II. THE NATURE OF TITLE VII LITIGATION 
The magnitude of the attorneys' fees awards problem in Title VII 
actions must be viewed against the difficulties of the litigation involved. 
Title VII class actions are extraordinarily complex, lengthy, risky, and 
costly cases. The Act itself prohibits employment discrimination based 
on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin by substantially all public 
and private employers, labor unions, employment agencies, and joint 
labor-management committees controlling apprenticeship or other train-
ing. Barred is discrimination in virtually all aspects of employment, in-
cluding recruitment, hiring, testing, job assignment, compensation, 
benefits, hours, promotion, training, discipline, seniority rights, termina-
tion, and retaliation.16 
The Act relies on a labyrinth of administrative exhaustion pro-
cedures,17 requiring initial recourse by aggrieved individuals to the 
agency created to administer Title VII, the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC). The charge must then temporarily be refer-
red to an appropriate state or local agency, if any, after which the com-
plainant is required to exhaust EEOC internal administrative 
remedies.ls Ultimate recourse to federal district court than may be 
taken by the complainant, individually or on behalf of a class, or the ac-
tion may be prosecuted by the EEOC.19 The already complex task of the 
complainant is greatly aggravated by the constant change in interpreta-
tion of these requirements occasioned by regulatory and judicial 
action.2D Finally, plaintiffs must comply with procedural prerequisites 
problem areas in the field, see R. LARSEN, FEDERAL COURT AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES (to 
be published Summer 1981) [hereinafter cited as LARSEN]; Court A warded Attorneys' Fees, 
supra note 9; Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 849 (1975); Comment, Calculation of a Reasonable Award of Attorneys' Fees 
Under the Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 13 JOHN MAR. L. REV. 331 (1979·80). 
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) to (d) (1976). 
17. Procedures governing federal employees are particularly cumbersome. Respon-
sibility for their administration was recently transferred from the Civil Service Commis-
sion to the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976)(Reorganization Plan No.1 of 1978, effective 
Jan. I, 1979)_ 
18. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.1-_74 (1977)_ 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) to -5(k) (1976). See generally B. SCHLEI & P_ GROSSMAN, 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 769-826 (1976) and Supplement 207-17 (1979); see also 
New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 64 (1980). Since 1972, the EEOC has 
been empowered to bring civil actions or to intervene in those brought by private parties, 
but lacks the vast gamut of civil and criminal sanctions available under the antitrust and 
securities acts. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5-(f)(l) (1975) and 15 U.S.C. § 77t(a)-(c)(1975). 
20_ See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1601.1-.74, as amended 1978, which established new EEOC 
procedures for the filing, drafting, investigation, settlement, dismissal, determination, and 
final processing of charges under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) to-5(c) (1976). See also Mohasco 
Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980); Delaware State College v. Ricks, _ U.S. _, 101 S_ 
Ct. 498 (1980); United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977)(timeliness decisions substan-
tially affecting plaintiffs' right to sue under Title VII). 
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and limitation periods of other statutes commonly pleaded in conjunc-
tion with Title VII.21 
Class action plaintiffs additionally must grapple with all the 
problems attendant upon class certification and management under 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.22 Until the Supreme 
Court's recent decision in East Texas Motor Freight, Inc. v. Rodriguez,23 
courts had long held appropriate under Title VII "across-the-board" 
class actions by one or more. named plaintiffs representing one or more 
protected groups, attacking the entire gamut of an employer's policies 
and practices. These actions were often prosecuted on a multi-facility, 
city-wide, state-wide, or even national basis,24 requiring a commen-
surately broad-based discovery and trial approach. Although courts are 
more wary of certifying post-Rodriguez across-the-board class actions,25 
they have continued to permit these actions where adequate class 
representation can be shown.26 Nevertheless, the possible conflicts of in-
terest among sub-classes, as well as the enormous expenditure of time 
and money they entail, have led many plaintiffs' attorneys to narrow the 
scope of the suit. 
The constant state of flux in the applicable substantive law ag-
gravates the inherently cumbersome nature of class actions prosecuted 
under the Act. The Supreme Court began substantive construction of 
the Act in 1971,27 and theories of proof under Title VII continue to be 
uncertain. In 1976-1977, the Supreme Court issued five decisions which 
dramatically altered Title VII law in the areas of seniority discrimina-
tion, pregnancy discrimination, class action certification, timeliness of 
21. See, e.g., Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206d (1976); Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976); Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871,42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 (1976). 
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
23. 431 U.S. 395 (1977). The Supreme Court in Rodriguez held that the named plain-
tiffs in that action, which had never been certified by the trial court, were not discriminated 
against and, therefore, given the peculiar procedural posture of the case, were unable to 
represent a class. [d. at 403-04. 
24. Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1975) (nationwide scope 
of action); Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975); Carr v. Conoco Plastics, 
Inc., 423 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 951 (1970)(across-the-board class ac-
tions endorsed); Parker v. Bell Helicopter Co., 78 F.R.D. 507, 513-14 (N.D. Tex. 
1978)(employees at one facility may represent workers in separate plant as well as ap-
plicants, as long as the interests of the class are adequately represented). 
25. Chavez v. Temple Union High School Dist. #213, 565 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1977); 
Ricks v. Schlesinger, [1981] 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 694 (D.D.C. 1979); Talley v. Hoechst 
Fibers Indus., [1981] 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 580 (D.S.C. 1979)(class action scope limited). 
26. See, e.g., Parker v. Bell Helicopter Co., 78 F.R.D. 507 (N.D. Tex. 1978). 
27. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), a unanimous Court held that 
facially neutral employment practices which could be shown to have a disparate impact or 
effect on blacks violate Title VII regardless of the subjective intent of the employer, unless 
the employer can demonstrate that such practices bear a manifest relationship to job per-
formance. [d. at 431-32. 
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filing of suit, and standards of statistical proof of discrimination.28 These 
decisions and others have marked a growing conservatism in the 
Court's interpretation of plaintiffs rights under Title VII.29 This trend 
has significantly augmented the plaintiffs' burden in these actions, re-
quiring litigators continually to develop novel alternative theories of 
discrimination adapted to the fluctuating legal standards and fact pat-
terns posed by contemporary discrimination law.30 
Even in areas where the law is relatively stable, Title VII.class ac-
tions present enormous problems of proof. Moreover, these difficulties 
have multiplied in recent years as plaintiffs have begun to pursue the 
so-called "second generation" of Title VII suits. As stated by one 
district court judge: 
If there ever was a time of facile Title VII litigation, it surely 
ended with the demise of intentional violations of equal 
employment opportunity. Today's parade of Title VII cases 
present more and more subtle manifestations of discrimina-
tion. Proof of invidious practices becomes more difficult as the 
ability to separate the real violation from the unfounded suspi-
cion grows harder. This is especially so since many employers 
and unions ... have made substantial good faith efforts toward 
eliminating racial distinctions from the workforce.3! 
28. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States 43? U.S. 299 (1977)(standards of 
statistical proof); Eastern Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 
(1977)(class actions); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 
(1977)(seniority); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 1079 (1977)(pregnancy); United 
Airlines Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977)(timeliness). 
29. Griggs itself may be in jeopardy. The Court in International Bhd. of Teamsters 
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), reversed every circuit which had ruled on the issue 
holding that a seniority system does not violate Title VII absent a showing, in essence, that 
the system was the product of intentional discrimination. Id. at 352-53. 
President Reagan's EEOC transition team has recommended that the proof of 
discriminatory intent should be applied to all employment practices. Lubin, Reagan's Ad-
visors Accuse the EEOC of "Racism," Suggest Big Cutback, Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 1981, § 2, 
at 21, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as Reagan's Advisors]. 
30. See, e.g., Croker v. Boeing, 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1192 (E.D. Pa_ 1977)(plaintiffs' 
case greatly affected by recent Supreme Court cases); Smith v. Union Oil Co., [1979] 18 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1183, 1184 (N.D. Cal. 1978)(court noted plaintiffs' difficult position because 
the case went to trial at a time when the state of the law governing class' burden of proof in 
Title VII class actions was in flux); Freeman v. Motor Convoy, [1980] 21 Fair Empl. Prac_ 
Cas. 168, 169 (N.D. Ga. 1979)(states that Eastern Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez 
431 U.S. 395 (1977), United Airlines Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), and International 
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) "constitute a jurisprudential trip-
tych setting forth entirely new rules for Title VII and Section 1981 litigation"); Allen v. Ter-
minal Transp. Co., 486 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (1980)(plaintiffs required to deal with "constantly 
changing law, especially in the areas of union liability and seniority"). 
31. Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539 F.2d 77, 99 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Boyd v. 
Bechtel Corp., 485 F. Supp. 610, 613 (N.D. Cal. 1979). 
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Title VII actions today can entail discovery, review, synthesis, and 
evidentiary introduction of millions of items of data, organized within 
abstruse statistical models designed to illustrate discrimination under 
the Act. The nature of these statistical showings has become increasing-
ly complex as discrimination itself has become an increasingly subtle 
phenomenon.32 
In light of these characteristics, Title VII class actions are 
characterized as extraordinarily risky, lengthy, and expensive undertak-
ings. Because Title VII plaintiffs are normally unable to pay even the 
costs of suit, let alone fees, and because the Act provides for attorneys' 
fees awards only to prevailing plaintiffs, fees in Title VII lawsuits are 
entirely contingent in nature. Title VII defendants, by contrast, are 
often large corporations with the resources to marshall large, well-paid 
law firms in their defense. These firms often wage unrelenting "wars of 
attrition" at all stages of the litigation.33 
Each major stage in these cases poses a high degree of risk. The 
risk of failure at the class certification stage has increased substantially, 
both as a result of judicial response to the Supreme Court's decision in 
East Texas Motor Freight Systems, Inc. v Rodriguez,34 and because of a 
growing tendency on the part of trial judges to require far more 
substantial evidentiary showings by plaintiffs in support of class cer-
tification.3s Moreover, under recent Supreme Court decisions, plaintiffs 
may not appeal the denial of a class action certification motion until the 
conclusion of the case, which must necessarily first be prosecuted to 
completion on a non-class basis.36 In a 1980 survey of 357 class actions 
filed in one district between 1970 and 1979, three percent of the cases 
studied had proceeded to trial on the merits.37 
Plaintiffs' risk of loss at trial is substantial in Title VII cases, and is 
particularly high in class actions where counsel, as fiduciaries for the 
32. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); EEOC v. 
Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1976); Smith v. Union Oil Co., [1979] 18 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1183, 1185 (N.D. Tex. 1980); see also Vuyanaich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 
[1981] 24, Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 127 (N.D. Tex. 1980)(132·page opinion largely devoted to 
detailed review of statistical methods of proof in an across· the-board class action). See 
generally Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLO. L. REV. 702 (1980). 
33. See, e.g., Jones v. Glitch, 489 F. SUpp. 990, 996 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 1980)(defense at-
torneys mounted a "never give an inch defense"). 
34. 431 U.S. 395 (1977). 
35. [d. See also Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 272-81 (4th 
Cir. 1980); Harris v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24 (N.D. Cal. 1977). 
36. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978); Gardner v. 
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478 (1978). 
37. Chatty, The Question of Job Bias, San Francisco Examiner & Chronicle, Nov. 
18, 1979, California Living Magazine at 7 [hereinafter cited as Chatty]. The author found 
that 15% were either dismissed for failure to prosecute or other procedural reasons, or con-
solidated with other actions; 20% more were settled prior to class certification. In 26% of 
the remaining cases, the court either denied class certification or granted defense motions 
for summary judgment. [d. 
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class, must press all possible theories of liability on behalf of 
unrepresented class members.3s Plaintiffs must prevail not only on the 
merits (Stag~ I), but subsequently on the equally problematic relief 
stage of the case (Stage IIl.39 All too often, proof of individual claims of 
relief in Stage II proceedings develops into a series of mini-trials on the 
merits.40 It should be noted that both liability and proof issues are par-
ticularly complex in actions brought against federal, state, or local en-
tities.41 
Even in the event of success by a plaintiff through both Stage I 
and Stage II of trial, appeals from final orders are common. Although 
many Title VII class actions are settled prior to judgment, it is not 
unusual for one or more persons to file and litigate objections to such 
decrees.42 Moreover, litigation of attorneys' fees issues, left open by 
many decrees, may occupy several more years.43 Lastly, plaintiffs' at-
torneys often are responsible for monitoring effective compliance with a 
court order or consent decree over a period of years following conclu-
sion of the case on the merits. 
In light of these factors, it is not unusual for Title VII class actions 
to require several thousands of hours of attorney and paralegal time 
simply to establish liability. Many cases drag on for five to ten years or 
longer if the case involves a substantively fluctuating area of the law. 
As recently noted by the fifth circuit in its fourth consideration of a 
Title VII class action originally filed in 1966: 
38. See, e.g., Allen v. Terminal Transp. Co., 486 F. Supp. 1195, 1201 (N.D. Tex. 
1980)(plaintiffs' counsel would have been remiss in duty as representatives of the class had 
they not pressed all available theories warranted in light of the law at that time); Jones v. 
Glitch, 489 F. Supp. 990, 996 (N.D. Tex. 1980)(single·plaintiff cases exhibit a rather low rate 
of success). 
39. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361-62 (1977). 
40. See, e.g., Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 476 F. Supp. 335 !D.N.J. 1979); see also 
Mitchell v. Mid-Continent Spring Co., 583 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1973)("formula" settlement of 
Stage 2 claims impermissible). 
41. In the House Report on the [1976] Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, the 
Committee noted that: "[I]n some cases, immunity doctrines and special defenses available 
only to public officials, preclude or severely limit the damage remedy." H.R. REP. No. 1558, 
94th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1976). See generally M. Dunlap, Attorneys' Fees Against Govern-
ment Defendants: Economics Requires a New Proposal, 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 311 (1979). 
See also the recently enacted Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96- 481, 49 U.S.L.W. 
193-96 (Jan. 13, 1981)(to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2412), which establishes guidelines for 
award for attorneys' fees to certain prevailing litigants against the federal government, but 
by its terms limits its application to exclude cases already covered by federal fee-shifting 
statutes such as "the Civil Rights Act .... in which Congress indicated a specific intent to 
encourage vigorous enforcement .... " H. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1980). 
42. See Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 572 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1978); Mandujano 
v. Basic Vegetable Prod., Inc., 541 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1976); Boyd v. Bechtel Corp., 485 F. 
Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1979). 
43. See Neely v. City of Grenada, 624 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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The length of litigation in complex Title VII class actions 
often rivals that of even the most notorious antitrust cases. In 
the instant case, we encounter another judicial paleolithic 
museum piece .... Nonetheless, we are undaunted by the 
crushing weight of accumulated record and remain mindful 
that the Court must not diverge from the direction chartered 
for us by the Title VII compass, no matter how long and dif-
ficult the journey. We, thus, address ourselves to the fourth 
appearance of this case, determined to ensure that the vic-
tims of illegal racial discrimination receive the full measure 
of relief which the law accords them.44 
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The resulting cost of these actions is immense, both in terms of 
years of time expended by an attorney who has no assurance of pay-
ment, and as measured by the financial outlay entailed. In one recent 
case, for example, plaintiffs requested compensation for over 2,770 
hours of attorney time and 244 hours of paralegal work, as well as reim-
bursement for over $90,000 in costS.45 These costs included statistical 
and computer resources and experts, and thousands of dollars in travel 
expenses occasioned by out-of-town depositions and other discovery.4s 
These hours and costs would have spiraled even higher had the case 
culminated in trial and appeal, rather than in settlement.47 Because of 
the contingency nature of Title VII class actions, the plaintiffs' law firm 
was forced to prosecute the case for over four years with no assurance 
of compensation. As a result of its experience in this and other cases, 
that law firm, the most prominent of the handful of San Francisco firms 
doing plaintiffs' Title VII work, has left the field.4s The staggering 
burdens involved in Title VII class action litigation are summarized in 
the recent Declaration of a Title VII lawyer forced to close his office 
deep in debt. 
The problem is that successful prosecution of a fair employ-
ment class action can require two or three thousand hours' 
work simply through the decision of the trial court, and 
paralegal time can easily amount to an additional couple of 
44. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1168 (5th Cir. 
1978)(EEOC charge filed Nov. 22, 1965; suit filed 1966; case still in progress). See also, Allen. 
v. Terminal Transp. Co., 486 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. Cal. 1980)(eight years from original filing 
of suit through attorneys' fees decision on appeall; Freeman v. Motor Convoy, [1980]21 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. 168 (N.D. Ga. 1979)(class certified 1974; trial order 1975; vacated 1978 in 
light of Teamsters decision; relitigation of most issues ordered 1980); Bowe v. Colgate 
Palmolive Co., 443 F. Supp. 696 (S.D. Ind. 1977)(fee decision in case spanning eleven years,' 
two appeals, and 387 docket entries). 
45. Thornberry v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. C-76-798 RFP (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 
1980)(Memorandum and Order 2, 10-11). 
46. [d. 
47. [d. 
48. Affidavit of Burdick supra note 10. 
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thousand hours' work. The expense of prosecuting a complex 
Title VII class action frequently is in the $30,000 - $50,000 
range, through the decision of the trial court [as to liability] .... 
Because the awards are ordinarily not collectable until after 
findings on liability have been affirmed and because it can 
take several years before such findings are even entered by 
the trial court, the prosecution of plaintiffs' Title VII cases on 
a contingent basis frequently involves an enormous financial 
drain on counsel. Because of this drain, I have been informed 
by a number of plaintiffs' Title VII attorneys that they are 
reducing the proportion of their time that they spend on the 
prosecution on such cases.49 
In light of the prohibitively costly nature of Title VII litigation, the 
courts must provide the bar with the realistic prospect of substantial at-
torneys' fee awards upon successful completion of a case. Private en-
forcement of Title VII will otherwise cease. 
III. LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OF TITLE VII's FEE AWARD PROVISIONS 
In calculating fee awards under Title VII, trial judges must 
recognize and implement the' strong public policy considerations 
underlying this legislation. Awards in Title VII actions should thus 
parallel judgments in antitrust and security cases. 
Both Title VII and the corporate policing statutes deal with in-
juries of an economic nature.50 Title VII was enacted as a central compo-
nent of the omnibus civil rights legislation passed by Congress in 
response to the acute racial crisis of the early 1960s. As expressed by 
President Kennedy in his Special Message to Congress of June 19,1963: 
The result of continued Federal legislative inaction will be 
continued if not increased racial strife-causing the leader-
ship on both sides to pass from the hands of reasonable and 
49. Declaration of Seymour, supra note 10, at 4; Declaration of Jules Gordon, 
Associate Regional Attorney, EEOC, filed in support of plaintiffs' Motion for Award of At-
torneys' Fees and Costs, Westerlund v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., [1981) 24 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. 1190 (N.D. Cal. 1980). 
50. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975)(Title VII); Mills v. 
Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970)(securities); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 
469 (1940)(antitrust); In re Gypsum Cases, 346 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Cal. 1974)(antitrust); See 
also Remarks of Senator Humphrey in urging passage of Title VII: 
The shameful fact is that educated Negroes often are denied the chance to get 
jobs for which they are trained and qualified .... 
Discrimination in employment ... is also harmful to the nation as a whole .... 
So, discrimination in employment is not only costly in terms of what it does to a 
human being, his general nature, his attitude toward his country and himself, but it is 
costing the American economy billions of dollars in loss of income. 
110 CONGo REC. 13091 (1964) reprinted in B. SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 1224 (1970). 
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responsible men to the purveyors of hate and violence, en-
dangering domestic tranquility, retarding our nation's 
economic and social progress and weakening the respect with 
which the rest of the world regards US.51 
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Congress' purpose in enacting Title VII was that of "eradi<;ating 
discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for 
injuries suffered through pa.st discrimination."52 
Enforcement of both Title VII and its antitrust and securities 
counterparts is predicated on a combination of public and private en-
forcement efforts, but the private plaintiff plays a central role in both 
areas. The United States Supreme Court highlighted early the role of 
the private plaintiff in enforcement of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and 
subsequently applied its reasoning specifically to Title VII. 
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was 
evident that enforcement would prove difficult and that the 
Nation would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a 
means of securing broad compliance with the law. 
When [a plaintiff] obtains an injunction, he does so not 
for himself alone but also as a "private attorney general" vin-
dicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest 
priority.53 
The broad role of the private plaintiff in the statutory scheme resulted 
from the failure of civil rights advocates to convince Congress to vest 
the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC), the enforce-
ment agency under the Act, with cease-and-desist powers, such as those 
exercised by the National Labor Relations Board.54 
Antitrust and securities legislation similarly depends upon the in-
itiative of private plaintiffs to achieve its goals,55 but the role of the 
51. 109 CONGo REC. 1157 (1963). 
52. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975). 
53. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968)(Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)), cited with approval in Christianburg 
Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416-18 (1978)(Title VIIl; New York Gaslight Club, Inc. 
v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63 (1980)(Title VIIl. 
54. See section-by-section analysis of H.R. 1746, 118 CONGo REC. 7564-65 (1972). Until 
the 1972 amendments, the EEOC did not even have the right to bring suit. Under the 1972 
amendments, United States Department of Justice's power to bring "pattern and practice" 
suits under § 707 of the Act was finally transferred to the EEOC and § 706 was amended to 
empower the EEOC to bring suit based on changes filed by EEOC or private changing par-
ties. However, under the 1972 amendments, the Commission's administrative powers con-
tinued to be limited to those of conciliation and persuasion. See M. Heins, The Fourteen-
Year Furor Over Equal Employment, 6 WORKING PAPERS FOR A NEW SOCIETY 71, 76 (Center 
for the Study of Public Policy, Inc., eds.)(1978) [hereinafter cited as The Fourteen-Year 
Furor]. 
55. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15h (Supp. 1977), as amended by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act 
of 1976. Pub.L. No. 94-435. § 301. 90 Stat. 1344 (private civil suit for treble damages for an-
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respective enforcement agencies under these acts is considerably 
greater than that of the EEOC. As noted by one writer, prior to the 
1972 Amendments to Title VII, the EEOC "could only investigate com-
plaints and attempt conciliation -- 'a poor, enfeebled thing.' "56 By 1978, 
lack of resources, leadership, and governmental commitment had 
culminated in a backlog of 130,000 unprocessed charges and a minimal 
docket of cases.57 A brief and controversial period of vitality under new 
leadership58 is apparently about to end with the advent of the Reagan 
administration. 59 
By contrast, the antitrust and securities laws provide for and have 
resulted in energetic civil and criminal enforcement by governmental 
agencies.60 The Securities and Exchange Commission is widely regarded 
as the single strongest agency in the Federal government.61 Similarly, as 
noted by one expert, "[t]he Antitrust Division [of the United States 
Department of Justice] is a law office, a good one with a strong tradition 
of high competence that transcends and perhaps inhibits programmatic 
change."62 
In both the civil rights and commercial spheres, however, the 
"private attorney general" function is central, and realized only if com-
petent counsel can be persuaded to undertake plaintiffs' cases. Ade-
quate attorneys' fees awards have long been recognized by Congress 
and the courts as a chief incentive to securing this representation.63 
titrust violation); Comment, Shareholders' Derivative Suits to Enforce a Corporate Right 
of Action Against Directors Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 578 (1966). 
56. The Fourteen-Year Furor, supra note 54, at 76_ 
57. Id. at 76, 77. 
58_ Id. at 76. 
59. It has already been reported that President Reagan's EEOC transition team has 
recommended an EEOC budget reduction and the imposition of a one-year freeze on EEOC 
lawsuits and regulations_ Reagan's Advisors, supra note 29_ 
60. For a full discussion of civil and criminal governmental enforcement of the an-
titrust laws by the United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal 
Trade Commission, see L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 751-69 (1977) [hereinafter cited ANTITRUST]. 
For discussion of governmental enforcement of the Securities Acts, see Jacobs, Judicial and 
Administrative Remedies Available to the S.E. C. for Breaches of Rule lOb-5, 53 ST. JOHN'S 
L. REV. 397 (1979); Mathews, A.L.L Proposed Federal Securities Code: Part XV-
Administration and Enforcement, 30 VAND. L. REV. 465, 482 (1977); Note, The Securities 
and Exchange Commission: An Introduction to the Enforcement of the Criminal Provisions 
of the Federal Securities Laws, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 
Securities and Exchange Commission]. 
61. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 60, at 143; [Oct. 6, 1976] SEC. 
REG. & L. REP. (BNA), No. 372 at A-5. 
62. Antitrust, supra note 60, at 752. 
63. One district court, in construing Title VII's attorney's fee provisions, noted: 
The court approaches [the award of Title VII fees] with an awareness of the im-
portance that adequate fee awards play in the vindication of the rights guaranteed by 
Title VII. Litigation in this area often involves extraordinarily complex legal and fac-
tual issues that many attorneys would simply be unable to handle successfully. The im-
portant individual and societal issues at stake in such litigation may not be adequately 
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The basis for judicial award of attorneys' fees for prevailing plain-
tiffs in Title VII cases is found in the statute itself, which provides in 
relevant part: 
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, 
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than 
the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's 
fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United 
States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.54 
Title VII's contemporaneous legislative history states that the purpose 
of the fees provision is to facilitate meritorious suits by persons of 
limited means.65 
protected unless attorneys possessing the requisite skills can be induced to take Title 
VII cases .•.. [T)he awards must be sufficient to make such representation financially 
attractive to highly qualified attorneys. 
Lockheed Minority Solidarity Coalition v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 406 F. Supp. 828, 
830 (N.D. Cal. 1976). See also United States v. Operating Engineers, [1974] 6 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. 984, 985 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Courts have similarly predicated fee awards in an-
titrust and securities class actions on the need to stimulate legal representation of persons 
bringing cases involving "corporate therapeutics." Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375, 
396 (1970). See also Beecher v. Able, 435 F. Supp. 397, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Knutson v. Daily 
Review, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 1263, 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1979), quoting Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. 
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968) (private enforcement of substantive antitrust 
policy is "bulwark of antitrust enforcement"). 
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976). Title VII is one of approximately 125 federal 
statutes which authorize discretionary or mandatory fee-shifting to prevailing parties or to 
prevailing plaintiffs alone. 3 FED. ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS REP., (No.5) at 2 (August 1980). 
These statutes constitute exceptions to the American rule, whereby eacli party bears his or 
her own attorney's fees. See Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co. v Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 
(1975). Plaintiffs who prevail at trial on Clayton Act antitrust violations are mandatorily 
awarded attorneys' fees from the defendant. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1976). Plaintiffs in an-
titrust class actions who successfully secure a settlement benefiting others similarly 
situated by creation of a "common fund" or a "substantial benefit" are awarded fees pur-
suant to a second exception to the American rule. In this situation, the courts exercise their 
equitable powers to assess fees from non-parties who have benefited from the creation of 
such fund or benefit. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Trustees v. 
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Stan-
dard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973). Prevailing plaintiffs in shareholder's 
derivative actions brought under § 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 are also 
awarded fees from the benefited corporation under the "common fund" exception. Mills v. 
Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970). Fees are awardable to prevailing parties under 
several of the federal securities laws, although these statutes are not designed to en-
courage "private attorneys general" under this act. See § l1(e) of the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 73(k)(e) (1976), and §§ 9(e) and 18(a) of the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(i)(e) and 78(r)(a) (1976). Commentaries on attorney's fee 
awards in antitrust and securities actions include Mowrey, Attorney Fees in Securities 
Class Action and Derivative Suits, 3 J. CORP. L. 267 (1978); Springer, Fee Awards in Anti-
trust Litigation. 44 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 97 (1975); Antitrust and Securities Class Ac-
tions, supra note 9; Attorney Fees: Awards in Class Recoveries, 3 CLASS ACTION REPORTS 
154 (1974). 
65. 110 CONGo REC. 12724 (1964). See Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 
412, 420 (1978). 
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The legislative purpose behind this statute is found not only in the 
legislative history of Title VII, but also in the more extensive history of 
the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, an act explicity in-
tended by Congress to be governed by the same standards as those 
prevailing under Title VII.66 Congress further underlined the impor-
tance of attorneys' fees to secure enforcement of public interest 
statutes, like Title VII, in its passage of the 1976 Act. As stated in the 
Senate report: 
In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the 
citizen who must sue to enforce the law has little or no money 
with which to hire a lawyer. There are very few provisions in 
our Federal laws which are self-executing. Enforcement of 
the laws depends upon governmental action and, in some 
cases, on private action through the courts. If the cost of 
private enforcement actions becomes too great, there will be 
no private enforcement. If our civil rights laws are not to 
become mere hollow pronouncements, which the average 
citizen cannot enforce, we must maintain the traditionally ef-
fective remedy of fee shifting in these cases.67 
The problems in implementation of this congressional purpose do 
not stem from overly restrictive rules concerning entitlement to fees in 
Title VII cases. Despite the discretionary language of the Act's fee pro-
vision, plaintiffs' entitlement to fees has long been liberally construed 
by courts in light of the beneficial purposes of the Act. Thus, award of 
fees has been held to be one crucial aspect of complete relief under the 
Act, necessary for the fulfillment of federal goals, and mandatorily 
awarded absent "special circumstances" which would render such an 
award unjust.68 Consistent with this liberal approach, plaintiffs have 
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 
[1976] U.s. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5908, 5912. "It is intended that the standards for 
awarding fees be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act." Id. 
67. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 5908, 5913. The 1976 Act was passed in response to the Supreme Court's decision 
in Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Alyeska barred, with 
a few exceptions, award of fees by federal courts in the exercise of their equitable powers, 
absent express congressional authorization. The 1976 Act provides for discretionary award 
of attorneys' fees, as part of costs, to prevailing parties in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986 (1976); 20 U.S.C. § 1681a-b (1976); 26 U.S.C. § 7401 (1976); and 
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). 
68. Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416-17 (1978), quoting 
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 401 (1968); See also Albemarle Paper Co. 
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) citing Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965) 
("Where racial discrimination is concerned, the [district] court has not merely the power but 
the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory ef· 
fects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future"). 
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held to be "prevailing" not only upon securing trial victory, but also 
when they have secured substantial benefits for themselves and/or their 
class through settlement, or through activity which serves as a catalyst 
to produce voluntary compliance with the Act by a defendant.69 Addi-
tionally, the Supreme Court recently held that a district court action 
may be brought to recover attorneys' fees for a complainant who 
prevails in state administrative and judicial proceedings pursuant to 
Title VII administrative remedies provisions.70 Finally, the EEOC 
recently published guidelines which grant prevailing plaintiffs fees for 
the prosecution of federal administrative proceedings under Title VII.71 
In contrast to the liberal judicial standards applied in determining 
eligibility for attorneys' fees under Title VII, the standards applied by 
courts in calculating the amounts of fee awards have operated to 
discourage, rather than to encourage, qualified attorneys from re-
presenting the victims of discrimination.72 This result runs counter to 
Congress' legislative purpose in enacting the Act's fees provision, as 
supplemented by the detailed congressional findings accompanying the 
1976 Act.73 
The Senate Report on that Act articulated three fundamental 
statements of congressional policy. First: "It is intended that the 
amount of fees awarded under [the Act] be governed by the same stand-
ards which prevail in other types of equally complex Federal litigation, 
such as antitrust cases, and not be reduced because the rights involved 
may be non-pecuniary in nature."74 Second, the Senate expressed its in-
tention that fees in public interest cases be calculated on the same basis 
as that employed by private practitioners in billing their fee-paying 
clients, that is, "for all time reasonably expended on a matter."75 
Third, the Senate cited with approval three cases which it found to 
have produced "fees which are adequate to attract competent counsel, 
but which do not produce windfalls to attorneys."76 None of these cases 
69. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980)(settlementl; Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 
F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971)(catalyst); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th 
Cir. 1970). But see Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, reh. denied, 448 U.S. 913 (1980)(par· 
ty not "prevailing" for purposes of interim fee award until he/she has established entitle· 
ment to some relief on the merits of the claim). 
70. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 71 (1980). 
71. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.271(c) (1980). 
72. See notes 7·9 & accompanying text supra. 
73. Not only is the Senate Report on the 1976 Act by its terms applicable to Title 
VII, see note 66 & accompanying text supra, but the Supreme Court also recently recogniz· 
ed its applicability to Title VII cases in New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 
70 n.9 (1980); see also Copeland v. Marshall, [1980] 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 967, 973 (D.C. 
Cir.1980). 
74. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE & AD. 
NEWS 5913. 
75. ld. 
76. ld. citing Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 19741; Davis v. 
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relies on the traditional analysis customarily applied by courts in public 
interest cases. Rather, each lays the basis for awarding substantial fees 
by use of criteria which expressly recognize the complexity, contingent 
nature, and public importance of public interest cases.77 
As discussed in the following section, these and other cases 
demonstrate the need for enlightened judicial implementation of a fee-
setting formula which more effectively implements the above congress-
ional directives than that customarily employed by courts at present. 
IV. Two METHODS OF FEE SETTING-THE ADVANTAGES 
OF THE LINDY ApPROACH 
In calculating statutorily and equitably based attorneys' fees 
awards in complex federal cases, most courts currently adhere to 
guidelines established by one or both of two cases: Johnson v. Georgia 
Highway Express Inc.78 and Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v American 
Radiator and Standard Sanitary COrp.79 The fifth circuit in Johnson at-
tempted to insure against award of inadequate fees in Title VII cases by 
requiring trial judges to justify their awards by documented considera-
tion of twelve factors: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill required to perform the legal ser-
vices properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney 
because of acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the 
fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or 
circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the 
experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the "undesirabili-
ty" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relation-
ship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.so These factors 
County of Los Angeles, [1975] 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 244 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Swann v. 
Charlotte·Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C. 1975). 
77. In light of the difficulty and excellent results of a complex Title VII class action, 
the court in Davis v. County of Los Angeles, [1975] 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 244 (C.D. Cal. 
1973), (1) set a generous hourly rate for the two experienced lead counsel in the case, 
despite their employment by a non·profit public interest law firm, (2) refused to reduce the 
award because of issues ultimately lost or dropped from the case, and (3) augmented the 
base award by a 10% bonus to compensate for the case's difficulty and results. In Stanford 
Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), the district judge, expressly adopting the 
fee·calculation formula used in antitrust cases, augmented by 21 % the base fee award in a 
complex constitutional case on the basis of the contingency nature of compensation, quality 
of the legal work, novel issues, and public importance of the results obtained. In Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C. 1975), the trial court awarded 
generous fees in a major school desegregation case taking into account inter alia similar 
fees paid to defense counsel, as well as the length, excellent results, and social importance 
of the case and immense hardship suffered by the plaintiffs attorneys in pursuing the ac-
tion. 
78. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)(Title VII). 
79. 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973)(antitrust). 
80. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 19741 
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were modelled after, and closely parallel, those established by the 
American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility.81 
The judicial concern reflected by the third circuit in Lindy was the 
limitation of trial court awards of excessively high fees in plaintiffs' an-
titrust actions yielding high monetary results.82 Accordingly, the Lindy 
formula, which has come to be employed by most courts in antitrust and 
other business litigation, disapproves fees calculated on the basis of a 
fixed percentage of the monetary recovery in the case. Rather, trial 
courts are directed to calculate fees on the basis of a prescribed for-
mula, by which a comparatively objective base figure is first calculated 
by multiplying the number of hours worked by a reasonable hourly rate. 
This "lodestar" figure which emphasizes the attorney's actual time ex-
penditure on the case may then be adjusted by a "multiplier" (e.g., 1.5% 
of the "lodestar") reflecting the court's more subjective evaluation of 
the increase merited by the contingency nature of the case, and, where 
appropriate, the adjustment merited by the exceptional quality of the 
attorney's services.83 
Until recently, the Johnson analysis, or a similar open-ended 
"multi-factor" approach, has ordinarily been adopted by courts for the 
purpose of calculating fees in public interest cases, including those 
brought under Title VII.84 Trial court opinions under Johnson typically 
consist of listing all Qr some of the twelve factors, accompanied by a few 
conclusory observations regarding each factor, and culminating in a flat 
dollar award, no part of which is specifically attributable to anyone fac-
tor.85 This process is inherently susceptible to great abuse, which may 
81. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 2-18, 
Disciplinary Rule 240-6 (B). 
82. See City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 469 (2d Cir.1974); Knutson v. 
Daily Review, Inc., 479 F.Supp. 263, 267 (N.D. Cal. 1979); In re Gypsum Cases, 386 F. Supp. 
959, 962 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 565 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1977); TWA, Inc. v. Hughes, 312 
F.Supp. 478, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), afl'd and modified on other grounds, 449 F.2d 51, 79 (2d 
Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, sub. nom. Hughes Tool Co. v. TWA, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 
(1973). 
83. Lindy 1, 487 F.2d 161, 166-69 (3d Cir. 1973); see also, Lindy II, 540 F.2d 102 (3d 
Cir.1976). 
84. See Neely v. City of Grenada, 624 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1980)(Johnson); Walston v. 
School Bd. of City of Suffolk, 566 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1977)(ABA Code); Allen v. Amalga-
mated Transit Union Local 788, 554 F.2d 876 (8th Cir. 1977)(Johnson); Kerr v. Screen Extras 
Guild, Inc. 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir. 1975)(Johnson); Walters v. Wisconsin Steelworkers of 
Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974)(ABA Code). 
85. For criticisms of this approach see Copeland v. Marshall, [1980] 23 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. 967, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1980); King v. McCord, 621 F.2d 205, 207 (5th Cir. 1980); Davis 
v. Fletcher, 598 F.2d 469, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1979). Courts continue, however, to issue con-
clusory opinions. See, e.g., Firefighters Inst. v. City of St. Louis, 588 F.2d 235, 242-43 (8th 
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 904 (1979); Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 384 F. 
Supp. 722 (E.D. La. 1974), afl'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 539 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 
1976). 
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or may not be corrected on appeal. In one 1977 case, for example, the ap-
pellate court reversed an award of $300, representing $4.50 per hour, in 
a largely successful fifteen plaintiff action.86 That same year, however, 
another appellate court found no abuse of discretion in a trial court's 
award of $27.00 per hour to prevailing Title VII plaintiffs.87 
The tremendous latitude afforded the trial courts through the 
Johnson approach provides greater opportunity for some judges to ex-
press, via their fee decisions, their own prejudices. First, as aIJ over-
whelmingly white, male, middle-class group, federal district court 
judges are often unfamiliar with or unsympathetic toward the interests 
represented by Title VII attorneys, their clients, and their cases.58 As 
expressed by one unusually candid judge in the context of a major 
school desegregation case: 
The case was difficult. The first and greatest hurdle was the 
district court. The judge, who was raised on a cotton farm 
which had been tended by slave labor in his grandfather's 
time, started the case with the uninformed assumption that 
no intentional segregation was being practiced ... , that the 
aims of the suit were extreme and unreasonable, and that a 
little bit of a push was all that the Constitution required of 
the court. The plaintiffs ... demonstrated that segregation in 
Charlotte was no accident, and that it was still the systematic 
practice of the school administration and the community at 
large. These and other factors ... produced a reversal in the 
original attitude of the district court.89 
A second judicial prejudice which is relatively uncontrolled in fee 
decisions under Johnson, is a perception of Title VII litigators as zealots 
86. Allen v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 788,554 F.2d 876, 880 (8th Cir. 1977). 
87. Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364, 372-73 (6th Cir. 1977). See also Neely 
v. City of Grenada, 623 F.2d 547 (5th Cir.1980)(award of $45. per hour for in·court hours held 
an abuse of discretion, but award of $35 per hour for all other legal work affirmed in suc-
cessful across-the-board class action against entire municipality); EEOC v. Strasburger, 
Price, [1981] 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1279, 1281 (5th Cir. 1980)(no abuse of discretion in 
trial court award of $2500 attorney's fees for over 236 hours of work by law professor in 
successful intervention in Title VII case). 
88. In February 1981, 450 out of a total of 516 district court judges were white 
males (87%); out of 132 circuit court judges, 10 were black, 2 were Chicano, and 11 were 
women. Telephone conversation with Sheila Joy, Statistician United States Dep't of Justice 
Statistical Dep't, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 6, 1981). In 1979, of the 525 active federal judges, 
only 29 were racial minorities and only 10 were women. Hearings on Selection and Confirm-
ation of Federal Judges Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 
(1979)(prepared statement by Charles R. Halpern). 
89. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483, 484-85 (W_D_N.C_ 
1975). 
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who do not expect or deserve to be compensated comparably with their 
more affluent equals in the commercial bar. This attitude was most 
clearly expressed by courts espousing the early-discredited theory that 
attorneys employed by public interest or legal aid firms either should 
not be compensated at all, or not receive compensation on th~ same 
basis as those employed in the private bar.90 The most recent permuta-
tion of this theory appeared in the panel opinion in Copeland v. Mar-
shall, recently reversed en bane by the District of Columbia circuit.9l 
The panel construed Johnson to require that awards of attorneys' fees 
in Title VII cases against federal defendants should represent compen-
sation only for actual costs incurred by their law firm on the case, in-
cluding attorneys' salaries, plus a "reasonable and controllable profit."92 
The circuit's rejection of this theory was based both on its inherent ad-
ministrative difficulties, and, more importantly, on its obvious adverse 
impact on public interest lawyers and law firms. The court explained 
that the cost-plus formula will yield different fees than the market value 
approach where the plaintiff is represented by a public interest law 
firm.93 Such firms often represent their clients for low fees or no fee at 
all. Since a cost-plus calculation focuses on the attorneys' salaries rather 
than the value of the services rendered, the individual attorney is com-
pensated at a rate far below the market price under this approach. 
Noting that Congress had expressly mandated use of a market value ap-
proach in enacting the 1976 Attorneys' Fees Awards Act,94 the court 
stated: "The purpose of Title VII's fee awards provision ... is to en-
courage the private enforcement of the civil rights laws. While some 
lawyers would assist in the private enforcement of Title VII for a re-
duced fee, congress has recognized that payment of full fees will pro-
vide greater enforcement incentives."95 
90. See discussion in Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1244·50 (3d Cir. 1977). See 
also New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980)(representation by public in-
terest group is not a "special circumstance" that should result in denial of counsel fees in 
Title VII action); Oldman v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1980)(§ 1988); Dennis v. Chang, 
611 F.2d 1302, 1309 (9th Cir. 1980)(Titie VII); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, [1975] 8 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. 244 (C.D. Cal. 1974)(Title VII). 
91. Copeland v. Marshall, 594 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1978), reh. denied, [1979] 20 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. 79 (D.C. Cir.); rev'd en bane, [1980]23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 967 (D.C. Cir.). 
92. Copeland v. Marshall, [1979]20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 79, 80 (D.C. Cir.). See also 
Page v. Presser, 468 F. Supp. 399 (D.C. Iowa 1979). 
93. Copeland v. Marshall, [1980]23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 967, 980 (D.C. Cir.). 
94. S. REP. No. lOll, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 5913, citing with approval, Davis v. County of Los Angeles, [1975] 8 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. 244, 246 (C.D. Cal. 1974). In Davis, the court held, "[IJt is in the interest of the 
public that public interest law firms be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees to be computed 
in the traditional manner ...• " [d. at 246. 
95. Copeland v. Marshall, [1980]23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 967, 973 (D.C. Cir.). 
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In general, however, with or without a Copeland approach, trial 
judges consistently have employed Johnson to reach fee determinations 
which utterly fail to reflect either the complexity of Title VII litigation 
or the Congressional policy underlying the Act's fee provisions. The 
resulting two-tiered structure of fee awards in complex federal litiga-
tion has been observed to constitute, in effect, judicial legislation of 
priorities among federal statutes. 
[I]n both cases [public interest and antitrust] courts are 
proceeding under Congressionally enacted attorneys' fees 
provisions designed to encourage private enforcement of the 
underlying statutory policies. One searches in vain for any ex-
pression by Congress of the relative importance of private 
antitrust versus private civil rights enforcement. Yet the 
courts have provided far more attractive financial in-
ducements for lawyers to represent private antitrust 
claimants. If judgments about the relative importance of dif-
fering statutory rates are to be made, those judgments should 
be made deliberately by Congress, not unwittingly by courts 
in the process of fixing attorneys' fees.96 
Ironically, the Title VII plaintiffs' bar may have contributed to this 
"judicial legislation" by failing to seek aggressively fees which truly 
reflect the value of their services.97 
In recent years, however, Title VII litigators have increasingly ex-
tended the focus of their work beyond substantive interpretation of the 
Act to efforts to secure the compensation necessary to pursue a continu-
ing Title VII practice.98 In light of the almost certain cut-back in public 
96 Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees. supra note 9. at 293. See also Stanford Daily v. 
Zurcher. 64 F.R.D. 680. 682 (N.D. Cal. 1974). in which Judge Peckham stated that "[t]he ra-
tionale of rewarding reasonable attorneys' fee. after all. springs from the need for placing 
the legal defense of certain constitutional principles and some Congressional policies on an 
equal footing with the protection of private interests" (citation omitted). 
97. As one judge noted in a recent Title VII case: 
The parties have not discussed the point. but the fee in this case was con-
tingent in the most extreme sense of the word. Plaintiffs' counsel will receive no 
more than awarded by this court. and had it been requested this consideration 
would have justified a serious notion of augmentation of the award .... The plain-
tiffs will be satisfied if they receive approximately what they have requested. so 
no multiplier has been applied .... 
Allen v. Terminal Transp. Co .• 486 F. Supp. 1195. 1198 (N.D. Ga. 1980)(emphasis added). See 
also Prandini v. National Tea Co .• 585 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1972)(plaintiffs requested $60/hour); 
Schaeffer v. Yellow Cabs. Inc .• 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972)(plaintiffs did not request fees 
for appeal); Gay v. Board of Trustees. San Jacinto College. [1980]23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
1570 (S.D. Tex.)(attorney voluntarily discounted hourly rate for routine services). 
98. This may be attributable to the cutback in foundation funding of public interest 
litigation. and to the movement of Title VII attorneys out of the public interest firms in 
which they have been concentrated and into the private practice of law. One recent survey 
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enforcement of Title VII under the Reagan administration, proper 
judicial implementation of Title VII's fees awards provisions is of para-
mount importance to the survival of the evolving Title VII bar .99 
The Lindy formula complements and organizes the Johnson 
guidelines into a structure which best achieves this objective. In 
recognition of its advantages, courts increasingly have adopted a Lindy 
approach in computing fee awards in Title VII and other public interest 
cases.IOO First, as a practical matter, Lindy does not splinter assessment 
of the circumstances surrounding a case into far more units than is effi-
cient or sensible. Many of the twelve Johnson factors overlap, or repre-
sent different aspects of the same basic consideration. Johnson factor 
number five, for example, the "customary hourly fee," reflects virtually 
every other Johnson factor. By contrast, the Lindy formula focuses on 
four critical and relatively discrete areas of inquiry: (1) hours worked; (2) 
the reasonable hourly rate to be applied to these hours; (3) adjustment 
reflecting the contingency nature of the case; and (4) adjustment reflect-
ing exceptional quality of representation. 
More importantly, Lindy prioritizes among these four considera-
tions: (1) Market value compensation for all hours reasonably spent in 
the client's interest; and (2) augmentation of a base "hours-times-rate" 
figure by a multiplier reflecting the contingent, lengthy nature of com-
plex litigation, and concomitant delay in receipt of a fee. This ranking 
of employment discrimination suits on file in the Northern District of California from 1973 
to 1978 found that over half of all cases culminating in decrees were litigated by legal aid 
societies, public interest firms and/or the EEOC, and that many other cases were handled 
by former employees of these organizations. Chatty, supra note 37, at 10. See also COUNCIL 
FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANCING PUBLIC INTEREST 
LAW IN AMERICA (1976). 
99. President Reagan's "EEOC transition team" recently recommended that a one-
year freeze on EEOC litigation be imposed, together with substantial cutbacks in the agen-
cy's budget. Reagan's Advisors, supra note 29. 
100. See Copeland v. Marshall, [1980] 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 967, 973-74 (D.C. 
Cir.)(expressly adopts the Lindy formula in calculating attorney's fees under "statutes like 
Title VIr'); Northcross v. Board of Educ. of the Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624, 636-38 
(6th Cir. 1979)(§ 1988 case adopting hours-times-rate formula, with upward adjustment of 
rate to account for contingency nature of case); Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Elec., Inc., 603 
F.2d 598, 603-04 (7th Cir. 1979)(Title VII case adopting hours-times-rate formula, adjusted by 
other ABA Code of Professional Responsibility factors, including contingency nature of case, 
results obtained, and quality of representation); Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 594 F.2d 639 
(8th Cir.1979)(action brought under Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,29 U.S.C. 
§ 621, adopting Johnson modified by "lodestar" approach). See also Merchandise Nat'l Bank 
of Chicago v. Scanlon, 86 Ill. App. 3d 719, 408 N.E.2d 248 (1980)(truth in lending action which 
applies Lindy rather than Johnson); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 471 (3d Cir. 
1978)(Title VII case adopting Lindy formula!; Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978) 
(§ 1988 case adopting use of formula established by Lindy and another antitrust case, Merola 
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 515 F.2d 165 (3d Cir.1975)); Westerlund v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 
[1981]24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1190, 1191 (N.D. Cal. 1980)(Title VII case adopting Johnson fac-
tors but utilizing Lindy approach); Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403 (C.D. Cal. 1980)(§ 1988 case 
adopting Lindy approach); see generally LARSEN, supra note 15. 
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requires courts to focus on the most important principles which in turn 
serves as an incentive for attorneys to undertake complex, lengthy 
litigation. 
A. Lindy Emphasis on Input Rather Than Results-
A Necessary Approach in Title VII Fee Setting 
The Lindy formula is predicated upon compensation of successful 
plaintiffs' attorneys on the basis of their input in a case, rather than on 
the monetary results of the litigation. Hence, the base fee is normally 
the product of all attorney hours actually expended on the case, times 
the market value of those hours. As noted in a recent survey of awards 
under Lindy in the commercial cases in which it is customarily 
employed, "the disallowance of claimed time is the exception rather 
than the rule."lol 
This approach is consistent with the congressional directives 
governing calculation of fees in Title VII cases. First, "[i]n computing 
the fee, counsel for prevailing party should be paid, as is traditional 
with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client, 'for all time 
reasonably expended on a matter.' " Secondly, "[i]t is intended that the 
amount of fees ... not be reduced because the rights involved may be 
non-pecunicary in nature."102 
Lindy's de-emphasis on the results of a successful action is critical 
in the Title VII area. The formula directs the court to consider "results" 
only when determining whether the base hours-times-rate "lodestar" 
should be adjusted in light of the exceptionally good or bad quality of 
the legal representation. As later clarified in Lindy II, this adjustment 
reflects both: (1) the results obtained, in an absolute sense and relative 
to the possible recovery; and (2) an evaluation of the professional 
behavior of the attorney in the particular case.103 The Lindy formula 
does not allow the court's evaluation of the results to affect its deter-
mination of the "reasonable hourly rate" in the lodestar, instead basing 
this figure solely on the market value of the services of the attorney as 
a general matter in cases of this type. 
The Johnson formula, by contrast, contains as one of its twelve, 
equally weighted fee determinants, consideration of the "amount involv-
ed and the results obtained."lo4 Although the decision does recognize the 
importance of rewarding injunctive relief in the across-the-board 
discrimination cases, it does not otherwise discuss the practical dif-
ficulties of a result-orientation, particularly one focusing on monetary 
101. Antitrust and Securities Class Actions, supra note 9, at 131. 
102. S. REP. No. lOll, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 59131. 
103. Lindy II, 540 F.2d 102, 118 (3d Cir. 1976). 
104. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (1976). See also 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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results, in Title VII cases. These problems arise as a result of Title VII's 
statutory emphasis on injunctive remedies necessary to eradicate 
employment discrimination throughout the economy. Consistent with 
that scheme, Title VII monetary relief is of an entirely equitable nature, 
limited to back pay extending back to a date not more than two years 
prior to the filing of an administrative charge w.ith the EEOC.lo5 As a 
result, relief orders in Title VII cases tend to yield limited outright 
monetary gain, in striking" contrast to the t-reble damages awards 
authorized under the Clayton Act.loS 
Many courts utilizing Johnson have focused their fee determina-
tion on the money damages yielded in the case, to the plaintiff's detri-
ment. The first circuit recently reversed one such decision rejecting 
the lower court's stated policy of imposing a fifty-percent-of-monetary-
recovery ceiling on attorneys' fee awards under the 1976 Attorneys' 
Fees Awards Act.lo7 The circuit court noted that the trial court's inter-
pretation of the Act ignores the reality that even actions for solely 
monetary damages vindicate the principle of civil rights, and that a fix-
ed percentage ceiling discourages private enforcement of civil rights 
acts.IOS Courts in Title VII cases often purport to de-emphasize the im-
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). The legislative history of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972 indicates that this limitation on back pay was imposed to roughly 
paralIel statutes of limitations on actions in other areas. 
Under existing law, recovery of back pay in such pattern or practice suits 
can extend back to 1965, the effective date of enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. Thus potential respondents .•. may be subject to enormous monetary 
penalties in the absence of a definite limitation. To avoid the litigation of stale 
charges and to preclude respondents from being subject to indefinite liabilities, it 
is clear that a precise statute of limitation is needed. In view of the tremendous 
backlog currently existing at the EEOC, and the failure to require a prompt ser-
vice of the charge on named respondents ••• equitable principles require a limita-
tion on liability. 
H.R. REP. No. 938, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
2175. 
106. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). See also H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976): 
Of course, it should be noted that the mere recovery of damages should not 
preclude the awarding of counsel fees •••. Furthermore, while damages are 
theoreticalIY available under the statute covered by [the Fees Act] it should be 
observed that, in some cases immunity doctrines and special defenses, available 
only to public officials, preclude or severely limit the damages remedy. Conse-
quently, awarding counsel fees to prevailing plaintiffs in such litigation is par-
ticularly important and necessary if Federal, civil, and constitutional rights are to 
be adequately protected. To be sure, in a large number of cases brought under 
the provisions covered by [the Fees Act] only injunctive relief is sought, and 
prevailing plaintiffs should ordinarily recover their counsel fees .... 
107. Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 (1980). 
108. Id. But see Harrington V. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 192, 197 (6th 
Cir. 1978)(trial court upheld in refusing to award fees to Title VII plaintiff who established 
violation of her rights but because of peculiar circumstances in the case was unable to 
establish a right to relief!. Contra, EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 
381 (D. Minn. 1980). 
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portance of monetary results/o9 but nevertheless calculate Title VII 
awards at levels which reflect concern over this factor.110 
Even under a Lindy analysis, plaintiffs' attorneys must anticipate 
that courts will continue to be reluctant to award large fees in cases 
which do not on their face appear to yield large monetary benefits to 
the class. Title VII a~torneys have recently attempted to address this 
problem by evaluating for the court the financhl.l consequences of the af-
firmative injunctive relief yielded by an order or decree. For example, 
goal and time-tables for accelerated hiring promotion, and/or training of 
affected class members, a common feature in Title VII remedial orders, 
ca:n be evaluated by an expert to ascertain their monetary value over at 
least the time-period of the court's continuing supervision of the case. In 
a recent nationwide sex discrimination case, 111 the settlement's goals 
and timetables were conservatively evaluated at $18 million over a five-
year period, and at $56 million over a ten-year period.112 
B. Contingency Multiplier-An Essential Consideration in Calculating 
Title VII Fees 
Johnson factor number six directs trial courts to consider the "con-
tingency" as opposed to "fixed nature" of the fee. As explained by the 
Johnson court, however, this factor is seen as relevant only to the ques-
tion of ·the attorney's original assessment of the prospects of the case.113 
Subsequent decisions have generaly rejected this analysis as either in-
correct or, more importantly, as irrelevant to calculation of the fair 
market value of the fee award.n4 
109. Copeland v. Marshall, [1980] 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 967, 986 (D.C. Cir.). See 
also Chicano Police Officers' Ass'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1980)(acknowledging 
propriety of fee award in recognition of substantial subjunctive relief); Rosenfeld v. 
Southern Pac. Co., 519 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1979)(same); Bachman v. Pertschuk, 437 F. Supp. 
973 (D.D.C. 1977)(same); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, [1975]8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 244 
(C.D. Cal. 1974)(same). 
110. See notes 9, 10 & accompanying text supra. 
111. Declaration of Guy Saperstein in support of Motion for Award of Attorneys' 
Fees and Costs, Westerlund v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., [1981] 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
1190 (N.D. Cal. 1980). 
112. Expert evaluation of injunctive relief has long been successfully utilized in both 
public interest and antitrust cases to support fee awards. See, e.g., Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. 
Supp. 403 (C.D. Ca. 1980)(replacement housing provided by defendants valued at $230,000 
million; rapid transit facilities valued at over $100,000 million); Merola v. Atlantic Richfield 
Co., 515 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1975)(trial court should consider expert testimony evaluating 
dollar value of three·year commercial leases as compared to one-year leases); Arenson v. 
Board of Trade of City of Chicago, 372 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Ill. 1974)(expert testimony admit-
ted concerning value to brokers of elimination of fixed-rate schedule). 
113. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974). 
114. See Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1980); Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 
483 (3d Cir. 1978); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary 
Corp., 540 F.2d 102 (3rd Cir. 1976); Sherrill v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 441 F. Supp. 846 
(W.D.N.C. 1977). But see Buxton v. Patel, 595 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1979)(prevailing single-
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By contrast, the Lindy formula places great emphasis on the 
substantial upward adjustment of a basic hours-times-rate award 
("lodestar") by a multiplier reflecting, in part, the contingent nature of 
success of the case.ns As elaborated in Lindy II, this factor requires trial 
court appraisal of: (1) the plaintiffs' burden in the case, given its com-
plexity, and the chances of success on liability and recovery of damages; 
(2) the risks assumed by the plaintiffs in developing the case, including 
the number of attorney-hours risked without guarantee of payment and 
the amount of out-of-pocket expenses necessarily advanced for the case; 
and (3) the delay in receipt of payment for the services rendered.lI8 
Commentators in both the commercial and public interest fields 
have stressed the importance of the contingency factor as an induce-
ment to attract plaintiffs' attorneys to undertake this arduous and risky 
work. In one recent study of commercial class actions, the reporter em-
phasized that the risks of contingent fee litigation are cumulative, and 
include both the general risks of losing even the best cases, and the 
specific risks of obtaining class certification, prevailing on liability and 
obtaining damages. The reporter concluded: "In order for a rational 
plaintiffs class action attorney to undertake a case with only an even 
chance of success, he must have a reasonable expectation of being 
awarded double the fee that he would receive in a case almost certain of 
success."117 
As discussed in Part II above, Title VII cases are arguably far 
riskier than their commercial counterparts. Not only are they enormous-
ly complex, lengthy, and costly, but they are also rarely, if ever, 
preceded by relevant governmental or other legal action against the 
same defendant, a common advantag.e in the commercial area. These 
risks are substantially enhanced by the rapidly changing and conflicting 
state of the case law, and the general inability of Title VII clients to ad-
vance even minimal costs.1l8 Also, the plaintiffs attorney is often pitted 
against financially secure defendants with retained counsel. 
Added to these risks is the very real danger that the attorney will 
be financially destroyed by the burden of deferred compensation. Title 
VII private practitioners tend to be relatively isolated in small practices 
which lack both the solid financial and experiential base of plaintiffs' 
antitrust firms. They, therefore, pursue their work to the almost total 
plaintiff not entitled to attorney's fees where action enforced single violation of private 
rights; presence of contingency fee agreement possible indication that attorney perceived 
case to have "bright [financial] prospects" and, therefore, needed no incentive to undertake 
it). See also Comment, Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, U. CHI. L. REV. 332 (1980). 
115. Lindy 1, 487 F.2d at 468. 
116. Lindy II, 540 F.2d at 116-17. 
117. Antitrust and Securities Class Actions, supra note 9, at 133-34; see also Court 
Awarded Attorneys' Fees, supra note 9, at 324-26. 
118. United States v. Operating Eng'rs, [1974]6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 985, 987(N.D. 
Cal. 1973). 
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exclusion of other, non-contingency cases, and have no capital base from 
which to draw salary and overhead pending final outcome of their con-
tingency cases.ll9 
Although the Johnson formula does not recognize Lindy's "con-
tingency" multiplier approach, courts increasingly have taken this fac-
tor into account in calculating fee awards in public interest cases.l2Q 
Nevertheless, while awarding contingency multipliers which double, tri-
ple or quadruple the "lodestar" in commercial cases,121 judges are reluc-
tant to apply multiples of even ten percent to fifty percent in Title VII 
actions.122 
This reluctance has produced precisely the unfortunate result 
presaged by a district court in 1974, which held that: 
[The] contingent fee ... allows attorneys-including at-
torneys who could not otherwise absorb the costs of lost 
cases-to take the financial gamble of representing penurious 
clients, since, over the long run, substantial fees awards in 
successful cases will provide full and fair compensation for all 
legal services rendered to all clients. From the public's stand-
point, the contingent fee helps equalize the access of rich, 
119. See note 10 supra. 
120. See Sherrill v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 441 F. Supp. 846, 849 (W.D.N.C. 1977)(ex-
pressly basing "incentive award" on protracted, contingency nature of Title VII casel; 
Westerlund v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., [1981]24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1190, 1190-91 (N.D. 
Cal. 1980)(purportedly using Johnson, but applying multiplier of 1.50 which reflected in part 
the protracted nature of contingency litigation); Copeland v. Marshall, [1980] 23 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. 967 (D.C. Cir.l(expressly adopting the Lindy contingency multiplier). 
Some courts reject the concept of a contingency multiplier, and instead inflate the 
reasonable rate to account for the contingency factor. See Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 
F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.s. 911 (1980). 
121. See.In Re Gypsum Cases, 386 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Cal. 1974)(contingency 
multiplier of three); Arenson v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 372 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Ill. 
1974)(multiplier of four); Goldstein v. Alodex Corp., 409 F. Supp. 1201 (E.D. Pa. 
1973)(multiplier of five); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard 
Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973)(multiplier of two even though criminal prosecu-
tions preceded case and additional fees were received through private contingent fee con-
tracts). 
122. See Westerlund v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., [1981]24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1190, 
1191 (N.D. Cal. 1980)(multiplier of only 1.50 in successfully settled nationwide class action 
against a major defendant); Neely v. City of Grenada, 624 F.2d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 
1980)(augmentation of fee held appropriate in light of such factors as contingency nature of 
case, when litigation corrected across-the-board discrimination affecting a large class); 
Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Elec., Inc., 603 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1979)(reducing from 
50% to 25% multiplier applied by trial court to reflect contingent nature of fees and quality 
of representation); Love v. Pullman, EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH)(19 Empl. Prac. Dec.) 1 9167 
at 7046 (D.C. Colo. 1979)(no contingency multiplier in successful major Title VII class action 
which went to United States Supreme Court on grounds that factors justifying incentive 
fee were already reflected in the twelve Johnson considerations); Parker v. Matthews, 411 
F. Supp. 1059 (D.D.C. 1976) a/I'd, 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1976)("incentive fee" of 25% ap-
propriate to reflect contingency and three other factors). 
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middle-class, and poor individuals to the courts by making at-
torney decisions concerning representation turn on an 
action's merits rather than on the size of a client's income. 
Courts' application of the doctrine in the aid of a 'private at-
torneys general' helps attract attorneys to the enforcement of 
important constitutional policies which might otherwise go 
unrepresented (citation omitted).l23 
635 
Judge Peckham's decision in the above case was one of those cited with 
approval in the Senate Report on the 1976 Attorney's Act as reflecting 
proper judicial application of standards in the computation of fee 
awards under civil rights acts, including Title VII.124 
In light of both the Congressional policy underlying Title VII and 
its fees provisions, and the harsh realities of the prosecution of employ-
ment discrimination litigation, the Lindy enhancement approach to con-
tingency fee litigation is a necessity. Perhaps the highest multiplier 
ever awarded in a public interest case, a 3.5 percent multiplier awarded 
in Keith v. Volpe,125 was based explicitly upon the court's acknowledge-
ment of the extraordinary length, complexity, and difficulty of the case, 
absence of a fee-paying client, and uncertainty of success on the merits 
at the outset. Close examination and recognition of these factors is im-
plicit in the Lindy approach. This recognition, in conjunction with the 
other advantages of the Lindy method of fee calculation discussed 
above, clearly recommended its use by all courts in calculating Title VII 
attorney's fees awards. 
V. ApPLICATION OF LINnYIN THE TITLE VII CONTEXT 
Two questions are of particular importance in judicial application 
of the Lindy formula in the Title VII context. First, should prevailing 
plaintiffs' attorneys be compensated for labor on issues on which the 
plaintiff did not ultimately prevail? Secondly, what is the "reasonable 
hourly rate" to be applied to the labor of attorneys whose billing rates 
fail to reflect the market rate for legal work of similar complexity, dura-
tion and risk? 
A. Compensation for Unsuccessful Work 
The circuit courts are split on the question of whether or not hours 
spent by prevailing plaintiffs' attorneys on ultimately unsuccessful 
claims are compensable. Some courts, typified by the District of Colum-
bia circuit, refuse to compensate these hours, often without discussion.126 
123. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680, 685 (N.D. Cal. 1974). 
124. S. REP, No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5912, 5913 
125. Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403 (C.D. Cal. 1980). 
126. See, e.g., Copeland v. Marshall, [1980] 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 967, 975 (D.C. 
Cir.); EEOC v. Safeway Stores, 597 F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1980); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 
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The ostensible rationale for this reduction is that it would impose an un-
fair burden on the defendant and/or would constitute a windfall to the 
plaintiffs attorney.l27 Many courts temper this position in cases in which 
the plaintiff fails to prevail on one of several alternative legal theories 
originally advanced to remedy essentially the same conduct, or where 
the successful claim was inextricably related to claims on which the 
plaintiff did prevail. Unless the claims are truly fractionable, these 
courts award compensation for all hours reasonably related to the 
primary successful thrust of the action, even though these same ser-
vices may also have supported prosecution of other, unsuccessful 
theories.128 Some courts have firmly rejected the narrow view, however, 
insisting that prevailing plaintiffs be compensated for all time 
reasonably calculated to advance the client's interest.l29 Many of these 
courts have relied on the legislative history of the 1976 Attorneys' Fees 
597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1979); Roesel v. Joliet Wrought Washer Co., 596 F.2d 183, 187 (7th 
Cir. 1979); Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972). But see 
Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997, 1026·27 (5th Cir. 1979) reh. ordered, 602 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 
1979)(award should be proportionate to extent plaintiff prevails but court should consider 
net result of efforts). 
127. See, e.g., Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997, 1027 (5th Cir. 1979) reh. ordered,602 
F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1979)(defendants should not have to pay for claims which lack the merit 
of some basis in fact or law). 
128. Copeland v. Marshall, [1980]23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 967, 975 n.18 (D.C. Cir.)(Ti· 
tie VII) no rigid percentage reduction for unsuccessful claim where unsuccessful "issue was 
all part and parcel of one matter"); Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 610 F.2d 46, 47 (1st Cir. 1979); 
Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483, 487 (3d Cir. 1978)(§ 1988)(compensation appropriate for all 
hours reasonably supportive of successful claims and necessary to overall success, even if 
hours also supported unsuccessful claims); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 
1978)(Title VII)(mechanical percentage reduction .for unsuccessful claims not appropriate in 
absence of close scrutiny of actual hours necessarily expended on prevailing claims); Wright 
v. Heizer Corp., 503 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Ill. 1980)(shareholders' derivative action)(ap-
propriate to compensate all hours reasonably related to primary thrust of case). The United 
States Supreme Court lent support to this approach, holding that fees ordinarily available 
to plaintiffs who prevail on constitutional claims should not be denied because a court has 
held for plaintiff on statutory, rather than constitutional grounds. This policy, said the 
Court, "furthers the Congressional goal of encouraging suits to vindicate constitutional 
rights without undermining the long·standing judicial policy of avoiding unnecessary deci· 
sion of important constitutional issues." Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 133 (1980)(§ 1988). 
See also, Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403 (C.D. Cal. 1980). This principle also found express 
approval in the House of Representatives Report on the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Act 
of 1976, H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 n.7 (1976). 
129. See, e.g., Sherkow v. Wisconsin Dep't of Pub. Instruction, [1980] 23 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. 939 (7th Cir.)(Titie VII); Johnson v. Nordstrom·Larpenteur Agency, 623 F.2d 
1279 (8th Cir. 1980)(Title VII); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980)(§ 1988); Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634, 637 (8th Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 987 (1978)(§ 1988); Allen v. Terminal Transp. Co., 486 F. Supp. 
1195, 1201 (N.D. Ga. 1980)(Title VII); Airline Pilots Ass'n Int'I v. United Airlines, 480 F. 
Supp. 1107, 1115 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, [1975]8 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. 244 (C.D. Cal. 1974)(Title VII); Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 
1974)("private attorney general"). 
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Awards Act, citing the language of the Senate Report: "In computing 
the fee, the counsel for prevailing parties should be paid, as is tradi-
tional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client, 'for all time 
reasonably expended on a matter.' "130 
Denial of compensation for ultimately unsuccessful claims has the 
practical effect of subverting this congressional policy by undercompen-
sating attorneys who undertake public interest litigation. As noted by 
one court: "We know of no 'traditional' method of billing whereby an at-
torney offers a discount based upon his or her failure to prevail on 
'issues or parts of issues.' "131 The economic burden of pursuing Title VII 
litigation thereby is shifted from the defendant- discriminator to the 
plaintiff-victim, who has succeeded in vindicating both individual and 
public rights under the civil rights laws. 
The probable effect of the rule is two-fold in the Title VII context. 
First, attorneys will be discouraged from taking the risky and difficult 
Title VII cases in the first instance. If attorneys know that in all 
likelihood they will not receive full compensation for the hours they 
have necessarily devoted to a complex Title VII case on which they 
prevail in part, many instead will choose to engage in litigation which is 
not subject to this "public interest discount." This result runs directly 
counter to the central purpose of the fee-shifting provisions of the Act. 
Second, contrary to congressional mandate, lawyers who do litigate Ti-
tle VII cases will be discouraged from pursuing all but the most 
straight-forward claims and theories.132 Ironically, it is the lawyers who 
undertake the most important class actions to enforce the Act that bear 
the brunt of this policy. Class action counsel are ethically bound to in-
itially pursue all theories which appear warranted at the outset of the 
litigation. Unlike their peers in more pedestrian practice, they are not 
able to secure informed consent from their class "client" to narrow the 
action to the easier issues. These lawyers constitute the backbone of the 
Title VII bar, yet are subjected to the largest disincentives to continue 
in this capacity. 
The growth in the numbers and sophistication of the defense bar 
coupled with the increasingly conservative bent of not only the 
Supreme Court, but also the legislative and executive branches as well, 
insure that this issue will assume even greater importance in the future. 
The recent Reagan transition-team report on the EEOC highlights the 
paramount importance of courts providing the maximum 'possible incen-
130. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5913. See, e.g., Northcross V. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980)(§ 1988); Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634, 637 (8th Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 987 (1978)(§ 1988). 
131. Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,447 
U.S. 911 (1980). 
132. [d. 
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tives to attorneys who are capable of handling this increasingly uphill 
work. Included in the recommendations of the task force are: 
(1) A one-year freeze on law suits by the EEOC; 
(2) Imposition of the requirement of proof of intent to 
discriminate in order to prove violation of Title VII; 
(3) Legalization of use of pre-employment screening devices, 
long held to disparately affect women and/or minorities 
without being justified by business necessity; and 
(4) Abandonment of EEOC use of hiring and promotional 
goals in settling charges.l33 
The Lindy emphasis on the reasonable input of the attorneys, 
rather than on the results of the litigation, is fully consistent with a role 
requiring compensation for all time reasonably expended in the client's 
interest. Moreover, Title VII cases do not present the troublesome 
issues created by implementation of this rule in the "common fund/sub-
stantial benefit" cases. The fees involved are assessed against the 
defendant law-violator rather than taken from the class which received 
no monetary benefits from the services in question. Additionally, the 
spillover in benefits of a partial victory for the class in Title VII cases, 
which focus on equitable relief, may be far greater than that in antitrust 
cases, which focus on monetary compensation to the class. 
B. Establishing a Reasonable Hourly Rate for Title VII Attorneys 
Perhaps the most difficult task facing attorneys and courts in ap-
plying Lindy is the determination of the "lodestar" reasonable hourly 
rate. Two aspects of the problem will be discussed below. First, the 
court must adopt the appropriate standard for determining the 
reasonable rate for each attorney's labor on the case. Second, the court 
must consider the impact of inflation on historic hourly rates which 
would have been billed and collected in earlier years of prolonged litiga-
tion, but which are not actually assessed by the court and paid until 
years later at the conclusion of the case. 
As contemplated by Lindy and its progeny, the "reasonable hourly 
rate" factor of the lodestar represents the rate normally charged for 
non-contingent work of similar complexity by lawyers in the community 
who have experience, reputation, and ability comparable to that of the 
plaintiffs' attorney.134 In antitrust and other commercial litigation, this 
figure is ordinarily reflected in the attorney's normal billing rate.13S This 
index is inappropriate in the Title VII area because Title VII attorneys 
do not normally charge their clients fees which reflect the market value 
133. Reagan's Advisors, supra note 29. 
134. See City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 471 (2d Cir. 1974); In re Equi-
ty Funding Corp. of America Securities, 438 F. Supp. 1303, 1329 (C.D. Cal. 1977). 
135. Lindy 1, 487 F.2d at 167. 
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of their skills. Reference to the billing rates of other Title VII or public 
interest lawyers in the community yields a similarly defective result. In 
light of the legislative history of Title VII's fee provisions, as clarified in 
the Senate Report on the 1976 Attorneys' Fees Awards Act/36 courts 
must instead devise indices for hourly rates in Title VII cases which 
reflect the "same standards which prevail in other types of equally com-
plex Federal litigation, such as antitrust cases .... "137 
In attempting to arrive at a fair market value for the work of 
public interest lawyers, courts have often relied on affidavits or declara-
tions filed by both the petitioning attorney and by respected practi-
tioners in the community.13s The plaintiffs attorney's affidavit states the 
attorney's legal background, experience, and special expertise in Title 
VII and other complex federal litigation. The affidavits of lawyers from 
the community may address the plaintiffs attorney's level of expertise 
and legal reputation in the community, stating the average hourly rate 
charged by the lawyers of similar expertise and reputation for represen-
tation of clients in similarly complex, non-contingent federal litigation 
over the period of time spanned by the case. These attorneys often cite 
their own or their law firm's billing rates, where such rates are reflec-
tive of the market value of services similar to those of the petitioning 
attorney. 
The affidavit-method described above is cumbersome and expen-
sive, particularly for attorneys who are not well-connected in the local 
legal community. It may also subject the affiants to detailed discovery 
by. defendants, probing into the affiant's billing practices and those of 
his or her firm in specific cases. At least two possible solutions to this 
problem have been attempted. 
First, plaintiffs' attorneys have directed courts to consider the fees 
charged by opposing counsel in the case under submission.139 Courts are 
divided on the question of the relevance and materiality of the defend-
ants' counsel fees in establishing the market value of the plaintiffs' at-
torneys' efforts. One trial court, for example, found that Johnson pro-
vides a mandate for plaintiffs' discovery of the rates of opposing counsel 
because these attorneys were most intimately involved in the litigation 
136. The Senate Report states: "It is intended that the standards for awarding fees 
[under the 1976 Act] be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act." S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 5908, 5912. 
137. Id. The Fifth Circuit recently expressly applied the principles of the Senate 
Report in evaluating a Johnson-based fee calculation in Title VII case. Neely V. City of 
Grenada, 624 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1980). 
138. See, e.g., Neely V. City of Grenada, 624 F.2d 547, 550-51 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980)(ex-
amples of attorney affidavits). 
139. Plaintiffs have also attempted to submit evidence of defense hours as probative 
of the number of hours reasonably spent in the case. See cases cited in notes 140 & 141 in-
fra. 
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at issue.140 Other courts have rejected as irrelevant evidence of the 
defense billing rate.l41 
Defense counsel's billing rates logically and legally may be the 
most probative evidence readily available to the court in determining 
the reasonable market rate of the efforts of plaintiffs' attorneys of 
similar experience levels. Congress implicitly authorized judicial 
reference to these rates in enacting the 1976 Attorneys' Fees Awards 
Act, by acknowledging with approval in the Senate Report the stan-
dards utilized in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, a 
case in which "fees paid to opposing counsel" was one of nine factors on 
which the trial court based its fee computations.142 
Possible objections to the discovery and admission of such 
evidence are clearly outweighed by its probative value. Claims of 
privilege, for example, are far less compelling arguments for defense 
counsel in the case than for outside attorneys who may subject 
themselves to defense discovery by attesting to their own fees in cases 
wholly unrelated to that before the court. Furthermore, courts can easi-
ly meet defense objections by subjecting information regarding defense 
fees to a protective order. Some courts' reluctance to consider defense 
counsel fees as probative of the value of plaintiffs' counsel's services 
may reflect an implicit value judgment that public interest attorneys 
simply do not expect or deserve to be paid the rates prevailing in large 
establishment law firms.143 To the extent that this view is based on 
anything other than the actual quality and complexity of the legal work 
performed by the specific attorney involved, it is clearly proscribed by 
governing case law.144 
In light of the time and expense of litigating the reasonable rate 
issue, it has been suggested that district courts approach the problem 
by enacting district-wide local rules which establish the upper and lower 
boundaries of a fee spectrum.145 The district would first conduct an an-
140. Naismith v. Professional Golfers Ass'n, 85 F.R.D. 552, 563 (N.D. Ga. 1979). The 
court found defendant's fees to be particularly relevant in light of Goldfarb v. Virginia 
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), which held unconstitutional the minimum fee schedule ad· 
vocated by the Johnson court. ld. at 563 n.6. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express Inc., 
488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 77 F.R.D. 
662,663-64 (W.D.N.C. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1980); Swann v. 
Charlotte·Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483, 485 (W.D.N.C. 1975). 
141. See, e.g., Samuel v. University of Pitt., 80 F.R.D. 293, 295-96 (W.D. Pa. 1978l; 
Nirabal v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 576 F.2d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 1039 (1978). 
142. 66 F.R.D. 483, 485 (W.D.N.C. 1975), cited in S. REP. No. lOll, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976J U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5913. 
143. One court has noted to the contrary, that "the extent to which defendants may 
have obtained high.priced legal counsel is relevant to show the reasonableness of plaintiffs 
in hiring high·priced counsel." Naismith v. Professional Golfers Ass'n, 85 F.R.D. 552, 564 
(N.D. Ga. 1979). 
144. See text accompanying notes 91-93 supra. 
145. This and other suggestions to reduce the uncertainties of fee litigation and 
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nual survey of rates charged by attorneys employed in litigation similar 
to that giving rise to court-awarded attorneys' fees, stratified by dif-
ficulty level and experience level. Based on the findings, the resulting 
fee spectrum would presumptively limit the court's discretion in 
calculating a fee.H6 
Whatever their disadvantages, both of these controversial 
methods of establishing plaintiffs' attorneys' reasonable rates have the 
effect of requiring courts to consider plaintiffs' attorneys' labor in public 
interest cases on a par with that of counsel in complex commerical 
litigation who are paid on a contemporaneous basis. 
The second major problem courts face when determining a 
reasonable hourly rate for Title VII attorneys is the need to adjust 
rates to reflect the monetary effects of prolonged delay in receipt of 
payment of fee. Although many courts purport to correct for delay by 
augmenting the contingency multiplier,H7 this factor involves a separate 
consideration which is more properly and easily dealt with in the con-
text of the reasonable rate issue. 
The delay factor logically diminishes the value of the fee when 
finally paid in two ways. First, the effects of inflation devalue each 
dollar ultimately awarded. Seconp, the attorney loses, the investment or 
interest income that could have been earned on the deferred compensa-
tion. These factors are illustrated by a recent survey of 186 fee awards 
in antitrust and securities class actions. The survey noted that the Con-
sumer Price Index rose between 1971 and 1979 by approximately 79%.148 
Therefore, a dollar in October, 1973 was worth only fifty-eight cents in 
February 1980. The survey's authors further cited a recent survey of 
lawyers' fees in large cities which demonstrated that the average in-
crease in the median hourly rate charged by attorneys between 1971 
and 1979 approximated the rate of increase in the Consumer Price In-
dex.u9 The authors note: 
Particularly for more recent cases, a multiple of 1.5 or 2.0 is 
not infrequently necessary just for successful plaintiffs' 
counsel to neutralize the time factor . . .. [B]y the time a fee 
is awarded, inflation has reduced its value by an average of 
thereby to encourage settlement, are contained in a letter dated May 6, 1980 from John T. 
Hansen, Esq. to the Chairs of the San Francisco Bar Association's Federal Courts Commit-
tee (reprinted as Appendix V to this article). 
146. Id. 
147. Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Westerlund v. Fireman's Fund 
Ins. Co., [1981] 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1190, 1191 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Weiss v. Drew Nat'l 
Corp., 465 F. Supp. 548, 552-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. 
Taylor, 82 F.R.D. 405, 412 (E.D. Pa. 1979). 
148. Antitrust and Security Class Actions, supra note 9, at 83. 
149. Ia. See also Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403 (C.D. Cal. 1980}(court adopts hourly 
rates for senior attorney which increased from $50.00 per hour in 1971 to $117.50 per hour 
in 1979). 
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21.3%. Thus in the average case, a multiple of 1.27 is required 
just to offset inflation, and a further mUltiple in the same 
range would be necessary to counter the interest loss 
factor. lso 
Similar adjustments for projected future inflation are commonly 
applied by courts in personal injury law suits. As stated by one court: 
"[lJt is inconsistent with economic reality and grossly unfair to the plain-
tiff to ignore the effects of inflation upon a damage award .... While 
the administrative convenience of ignoring inflation when the rates are 
high is to ignore economic reality."151 These cases stress that future in-
flation is not speculative, but rather, it is capable of definition and 
prediction by economic experts, and must be considered if victims are to 
be fully compensated. This logic is considerably more persuasive in the 
context of computation of fee awards, since relevant rates of historic 
inflation are a matter of public record rather than future speculation. If 
courts are to fully implement the congressional purpose of Title VII's 
fee award provisions, some adjustment for inflation and/or interest must 
be made in lengthy cases. 
Courts are divided, however, in their approach to the problem. 
Some courts simply refuse to make any accommodations at all to this 
factor.152 Others "inflate" historic, or past, hourly rates for each month 
or year of the litigation by application of an indicator like the Consumer 
Price Indexl53 to reach the current dollar value of each individual past 
rate.l54 Alternatively, some judges have recognized the advantages of 
correcting for inflation by applying current hourly rates to all hours ex-
pended in the litigation at any time.155 This method allows compensation 
for both the loss of interest and inflation. Nor is this approach overly 
generous; as one court noted: "if we used historic rates and added to 
150. Antitrust and Securities Class Actions, supra note 9. 
151. United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63, 74-75 (9th Cir_ 1975). See also Sauers v. 
Alaska Barge, 600 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1979). 
152. See Kinsey v. Legg Mas9n Wood Walker, (1980) 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 773, 
776-77 (D.C. Cir. 1978), where the court refused to award an interest rate on fees stemming 
from approximately seven years of litigation. 
153. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. DEP'T OF LABOR, Consumer Price Index for 
Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers, U.S. City Average, All Items, in CPI DETAIL-
ED REPORT-JAN. 1981 DATA (March 1971) at Table 7. 
154. See, e.g., Parker v. Califano, 443 F. Supp. 789, 793 (D.D.C. 1978), where the court 
stated: "multiplying the $65/hour rate by the current Gross National Product deflator fac-
tor for 1975-1.110-results in a current value of $72/hour, which the Court finds to be fair 
and reasonable compensation"). 
155. Lindy I/, 504 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976)(current rates applied); In re Master Key An-
titrust Litigation, 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) , 61.887 (D. Conn. 1978)(dictum endorsing use of 
current rates)(court stated "attorneys are ordinarily justified in 'seeking payment of past 
charges in terms of present dollar values' "); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 
395 (D.D.C. 1978)(uses current rates because it simplifies calculation and "roughly counter-
balances inflation"). 
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them compensation for interest and inflation, the Court would add far 
more than the 5-11% difference between a calculation of the hours at 
.the two different rates."158 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Enforcement of Title VII depends largely on effective litigation by 
victims of discrimination acting in the capacity of "private attorneys 
genera!." This function, in turn, 'is realized only if the Act's fee-shifting 
provisions are liberally construed to yield fee awards at a level which 
encourages attorneys to undertake Title VII cases. This principle finds 
clear expression in the legislative history applicable to the Act, as most· 
succinctly articulated in the Senate Report on the Civil Rights At-
torneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976.157 That Report directs Title VII 
courts to compensate plaintiffs' attorneys pursuant to the same stand-
ards as those employed in other areas of complex federal litigation; to 
calculate these awards on the same basis as fees billed by private practi-
tioners, for all time reasonably spent on the case; to fully recognize and 
compensate injunctive relief; and to adjust the award to compensate for 
the complexity, length and risk of the case.l58 
Judicial response to this legislative imperative has produced a con-
trary result. Fees awarded to prevailing plaintiffs in Title VII cases are 
customarily calculated at minimal levels reflecting judicial disregard for 
the determinants stressed by Congress and lack of recognition of the 
enormous costs in hours and dollars of federal litigation which is of max-
imum complexity and risk. Awards under the Act compare so un-
favorably to those made in other areas of complex federal litigation as 
to impute to federal judges a view of civil rights as less deserving of 
vindication than the economic rights secured by the antitrust and cor-
porate securities acts. 
Attorneys seeking to enforce judicial recognition and implementa-
tion of the congressional purpose underlying Title VII and its fees pro-
visions must convince courts to employ a method of fee calculation 
which most effectively compensates attorneys who undertake Title VII 
cases. The multi-factor approach commonly employed by courts in 
calculating Title VII fee awards159 has proven disastrously inadequate to 
the task. The factors themselves fail adequately to recognize and 
reward either the contingent nature and delayed receipt of payment in 
Title VII cases, or their enormous complexity and impact. The Johnson 
156. City of New York v. Darling-Delaware, 440 F. Supp. 1132, 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
157. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5908, 5913. 
158. Iii 
159. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 
1974); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 2-18, Disciplinary 
Rule 240-6 (B). 
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approach also fragments judicial consideration of the circumstances sur-
rounding each case, and provides no structure of priorities within which 
to calculate an actual dollar amount. As a result, courts have been free 
to acknowledge each of the factors in passing, while proceeding to exer-
cise largely unreviewable discretion in calculating an inadequate 
reward. 
The formula established in Lindy/50 by contrast, requires judges to 
predicate their awards on the attorneys' input in the case, compensated 
at an hourly rate found to be reasonable for complex federal litigation, 
and adjusted by a factor reflecting close scrutiny of the contingency 
nature of the fee, delay in receipt of payment, and exceptional quality of 
effort expended and result achieved in a particular case. Awards made 
under Lindy are thereby focused upon the factors which most influence 
an attorney's economic decision to undertake Title VII cases. Lindy 
awards also subject the trial court's determination to focused appellate 
review, insuring that the purposes underlying the fee-shifting provision 
of the Act will be properly implemented by trial courts. 
Trial judges must liberally implement Lindy in light of the broad 
remedial purposes of Title VII. This requires affirmative response to 
problem issues raised by litigation under the Act, including those posed 
by determination of reasonable hourly rates, compensation for con-
tingency nature and delayed receipt of payment of fee, and remunera-
tion for the many hours necessarily expended on matters on which the 
plaintiffs do not ultimately prevail. When properly implemented, Lindy 
represents the best vehicle presently available to courts for calculating 
reasonable Title VII attorneys' fees awards. 
Trial court implementation of the Lindy formula in Title VII fee 
calculations is obviously no panacea for the ills that afflict the Title VII 
bar. Nevertheless, liberal application of the formula, in response to the 
problems discussed above as well as those in other troublesome areas, 
may yield fees sufficient to attract and support the highly skilled 
attorneys required to prosecute effect Title VII litigation. 
160. See notes 82-83 & asccompanying text supra for a discussion of the Lindy ap-
proach. 
